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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES

by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr 
BANKRUPTCY 
GENERAL 
EXEMPTIONS. 
FARM PROGRAM PAYMENTS. The debtors filed for Chapter 
7 in January 2003. Although the debtors had ceased farming in 
December 2002, the debtors were owed direct federal farm 
program payments based on their 2002 crops. The debtors sought 
to exempt the payments under Iowa Code § 627.6(8) which 
provides an exemption for “any public assistance benefit.” The 
debtors argued that the payments were public assistance because 
the payments were not made in exchange for goods or services. 
The Bankruptcy Court noted that the federal farm program 
payments were not determined by the need of the debtors but 
were paid regardless of the financial condition of the debtors. 
The Bankruptcy Court held that the farm program payments were 
not public assistance payments entitled to the state exemption. 
The appellate court reversed, holding that the payments were 
entitled to the exemption because (1) the state exemption was 
worded broadly enough to include federal farm program 
assistance payments and (2) the federal farm program payments 
were intended by Congress to provide assistance to needy farmers. 
The Digest will publish an article by Neil Harl and Roger 
McEowen on this case in a future issue. In re Wilson, 2004 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 1083 (N.D. Iowa Jan. 27, 2004), rev’g and rem’g, 
296 B.R. 810 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2003). 
CHAPTER 12 
CONVERSION. The debtors originally filed under Chapter 
12 but creditors and the trustee objected to the debtors’ eligibility 
because the debtors’ debts exceeded the statutory limit. The 
debtors agreed to a motion to dismiss the case unless the debtors 
filed a motion to convert the case. The debtors then filed a motion 
under Section 1208 to convert the case to Chapter 11. The court 
held that the debtors could not use Section 1208 to convert the 
case because the debtors were not eligible for Chapter 12. The 
court acknowledged that several other courts have allowed 
conversions from Chapter 12 to Chapter 11 if the equities favored 
the debtor. However, the court held that there was no statutory 
authority for allowing a conversion to chapter 11 under any 
circumstances and denied the debtors’ motion to convert to 
Chapter 11. In re Stumbo, 301 B.R. 34 (S.D. Iowa 2002). 
PLAN. The debtor’s Chapter 12 plan provided for the sale of 
farm equipment collateral with the proceeds used to pay other 
unsecured creditors. The creditor with a priority lien on the 
equipment objected to that plan provision because it would not 
receive any of the proceeds or a lien in other property. The debtor 
argued that the loss of the collateral to the secured creditor was 
allowed because the creditor was oversecured with the remaining 
collateral in the estate. The court held that lien could not be 
avoided by the Chapter 12 plan against the wishes of the secured 
creditor because the creditor did not receive the collateral or 
proceeds and did not receive a lien in other property. The court 
also denied confirmation of the plan because the plan did not 
provide a market rate of interest on the unpaid secured claims. 
The debtor’s plan provided for an interest rate of 5.75 percent. 
The court noted that the minimum allowable interest rate was 
the 20-year U.S. Treasury bond rate of 5.48 percent plus 2 percent 
for risk. Finally, the court rejected the debtor’s plan because its 
projections of income and expenses were not consistent with the 
historical income and expenses of the farm and other business 
operations; therefore, the plan was not feasible. The court held 
that the case was dismissed for unreasonable delay because the 
debtor had submitted eight plans over three years without success. 
In re Michels, 301 B.R. 9 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2003). 
UNSECURED CLAIMS. After the debtors’ Chapter 12 plan 
was confirmed, the debtors received an inheritance. The debtors 
filed a motion to have much of the inheritance applied for full 
payment of unsecured claims in the bankruptcy case except for 
the unsecured portion of the Farm Service Agency’s claim. The 
debtors’ only remotely plausible argument was that the FSA had 
received payment from the sale of collateral but the court found 
that was untrue. The court denied the debtors’ motion to the extent 
it did not provide for payment of the FSA unsecured claims in 
the same manner as the other unsecured claims. In re Baker, 
300 B.R. 639 (W.D. Penn. 2003). 
CHAPTER 13 
DISCHARGE. The debtor owed a judgment awarded in a 
patent infringement lawsuit against the debtor for saving and 
using seeds from cotton and soybean plants grown from 
genetically modified cotton and soybean seeds without paying 
additional licensing fees. The jury had found that the debtor 
willfully infringed upon the seed producer’s patented seed 
technology. The seed producer sought to have the judgment award 
declared nondischargeable under Section 523(a)(6) for willful 
and malicious injury to the creditor’s property. Although the 
debtor admitted that the jury finding established the element of 
willfulness, the debtor denied that the patent infringement was 
malicious. The Bankruptcy Court held that the producer failed 
to demonstrate that the debtor’s action in saving and planting 
the seed from the genetically modified seed plants was done with 
intent to harm the seed producer. Therefore, the judgment was 
dischargeable. The appellate court reversed, holding that the 
element of maliciousness was evident from the debtor’s 
knowledge that the saving of the seed would be to the detriment 
of the seed producer. The appellate court held that the judgment 
debt was nondischargeable. In re Trantham, 2004 Bankr. 
LEXIS 62 (Bankr. 6th Cir. 2004), rev’g, 286 B.R. 650 (Bankr. 
W.D. Tenn. 2002). 
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FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL 
PROGRAMS 
FARM LOANS. The FSA has adopted as final regulations 
which provide that borrowers who are current on an FSA loan 
before the beginning date of the incidence period of a 
Presidentially-declared disaster or emergency, but who receive 
debt forgiveness on that loan following the disaster, are eligible 
for direct and guaranteed operating loan assistance if all other 
regulatory requirements are met. The regulations also amend 
the rules for direct farm ownership loans by making applicants 
eligible if they participated in the business operations of a farm 
or ranch for at least three of the past 10 years and meet other 
regulatory requirements. In addition, the rule amends 
regulations concerning recapture of shared appreciation 
agreement debt to allow reamortization of the debt in the case 
of default due to circumstances beyond the borrower’s control 
and where the debtor made a good faith attempt to repay the 
debt. The final regulations allow such reamortization where 
the farmer has no current program debts and where the SSA 
debt resulted from the payoff of the SSA loan. 69 Fed. Reg. 
5259 (Feb. 4, 2004). 
WIND ELECTRICITY GENERATORS. The plaintiff 
was a farmer who purchased a wind electricity generator. The 
plaintiff contacted the rural cooperative electric company and 
sought compensation for the net electricity generated on the 
plaintiff’s farm. The parties failed to reach an agreement on the 
price for the electricity generated by the plaintiff and the plaintiff 
sought enforcement of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies 
Act of 1978 (PURPA), 16 U.S.C. § 824 a-3(h) (1994), which 
requires utilities to purchase excess generated electricity from 
customers. The defendant cooperative had argued in state courts 
that jurisdiction lay only with the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (FERC) and argued before FERC that jurisdiction 
governing electricity rates lay only with the state. The FERC 
chided the defendant for its inconsistent arguments and the 
delay it caused. The FERC ruled that the electric company was 
required to comply with PURPA and that, if the parties did not 
reach an agreement as to the price to be paid for the excess 
electricity, the FERC would begin an enforcement proceeding 
in the courts. Swecker v. Midland Power Coop., 105 F.E.R.C. 
¶ 61,238, 2003 FERC LEXIS 2340 (Nov. 19, 2003). 
FEDERAL ESTATE 
AND GIFT TAXATION 
MARITAL DEDUCTION. The decedent had created a 
revocable trust, which, upon decedent’s death, distributed 
property to a marital trust for which the estate claimed a marital 
deduction. The trust instrument states that, if the assets in the 
residue of the probate estate were insufficient to pay the federal 
estate tax and legal costs, the revocable trust was to pay the federal 
estate tax and legal costs from property that would otherwise 
pass to the decedent’s surviving spouse. The decedent’s will had 
no provision as to the source of payment of federal estate tax 
and legal costs if the assets in the residue of the probate estate 
were insufficient to pay the estate tax and costs. The decedent’s 
residue estate did not have sufficient assets to pay the federal 
estate tax and legal costs. The estate argued that, under Illinois 
law, where the will is silent as to the source of payment of estate 
tax, the tax is apportioned equally among all heirs; therefore, the 
marital trust bequest and eligible deduction are reduced only by 
the trust’s share of the taxes. The court held that the trust language 
controlled to provide that all federal estate taxes and legal costs 
were to be paid from the marital trust, reducing the eligible marital 
deduction. Estate of Lurie v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2004-19. 
VALUATION. The decedent owned two retirement accounts 
containing stock which passed under the estate to heirs. The estate 
argued that the value of the two accounts should be reduced to 
reflect the income tax liabilities incurred by the beneficiaries. 
The court considered the accounts as a collection of the assets, 
the stock included in the accounts, and not as single assets in 
themselves. Therefore, a willing buyer of the stock would not 
have any income tax liability and the income tax liability of the 
beneficiaries would not effect the value of the stock to a willing 
buyer. The court noted that, under I.R.C. § 691(c), the 
beneficiaries were entitled to an income tax deduction for estate 
tax attributable to an asset received by inheritance. Estate of 
Smith v. Comm’r, 2004-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,476 (S.D. 
Tex. 2004). 
VALUATION OF STOCK. The decedent’s estate included 
stock in a closely-held corporation. The stock was preferred stock 
subject to a redemption agreement at over $1,000 per share plus 
interest if the redemption occurred after specified dates. The 
estate valued the stock at book value, $10 per share, but the stock 
was redeemed under the redemption agreement a year after the 
decedent’s death at $1,000 plus interest. The Tax Court held that 
the redemption was relevant to the value of the stock at the 
decedent’s date of death because the redemption was foreseeable 
and the corporation had sufficient funds to make the redemption 
on the date of the decedent’s death. The Tax Court, however, 
allowed a 4 percent discount to the value of the stock as a 
“reasonable discount” for a potential purchaser. The appellate 
court remanded the case on this issue for the Tax Court to provide 
an explanation for the choice of a 4 percent valuation discount. 
On remand the Tax Court increased the discount to 12.5 percent 
for risk that the company would not redeem the shares for the 
full price. Estate of Trompeter v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2004­
27, on rem. from, 2002-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) § 60,428 (9th 
Cir. 2002), rev’g and rem’g, T.C. Memo. 1998-35. 
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FEDERAL INCOME 
TAXATION 
ACCOUNTING METHOD. The IRS has announced that 
for depreciable or amortizable property placed in service by 
the taxpayer in taxable years ending before the effective date 
of Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1T(e)(2)(ii)(d), the IRS will not assert 
that a change in computing depreciation under I.R.C. § 167, 
168, 197, 1400I, 1400L(b), or 1400L(c), or ACRS for 
depreciable or amortizable property that is treated as a capital 
asset under the taxpayer’s present and proposed methods of 
accounting is a change in method of accounting under section 
446(e). For property placed in service after the effective date 
of the regulation, the IRS’s position continues to be that a 
change in computing depreciation under section 167, 168, 197, 
1400I, 1400L(b), or 1400L(c), or ACRS generally is a change 
in method of accounting under I.R.C. § 446(e) for which the 
consent of the Commissioner is required. Chief Counsel 
Notice CC-2004-007. 
CHILD TAX CREDIT. The IRS has published a reminder 
to taxpayers that they cannot claim the full $1,000 child tax 
credit for each child if they received an advance payment check 
in 2003. Taxpayers must put the amount of their advance 
payment check on line 2 of their Child Tax Credit Worksheet. 
Taxpayers use this worksheet, found in the instructions for 
Forms 1040 and 1040A or in IRS Publication 972, to figure 
the amount of credit they can claim on their 2003 tax returns. 
Taxpayers whose advance payment was larger than the amount 
of their credit will not have to repay the difference and will 
not claim any Child Tax Credit on their 2003 returns. If the 
advance payment was reduced because of past-due taxes or 
certain non-tax debts, the taxpayer must use the full advance 
amount before the offset in the worksheet. IR-2004-15. 
CLEAN-FUEL VEHICLE DEDUCTION. The IRS has 
certified the Honda Insight, Model Years 2003 and 2004, and 
the Honda Civic Hybrid, Model Year 2004, as being eligible 
for the clean-fuel vehicle deduction. The certification means 
taxpayers who purchase any of these new hybrid vehicles may 
claim a tax deduction of up to $2,000 for vehicles purchased 
in tax year 2003, up to $1,500 for 2004, up to $1,000 in 2005 
and up to $500 for 2006. To claim the deduction, write “clean 
fuel” on Line 33 of the 2003 Form 1040 and enter the 
appropriate credit. IR-2004-16. 
COOPERATIVES. The taxpayer was a tax-exempt rural 
telephone cooperative. The taxpayer invested in a corporation 
which was formed to operate cellular telephone services to 
the taxpayer’s customers. The investment was made to prevent 
loss of the taxpayer’s land line customer base to the new 
cellular phone technology. The taxpayer also purchased two 
wireless frequencies licenses. However, the cost of the 
construction of the wireless system proved to be too expensive 
and the taxpayer sold its stock in the corporation and sold the 
two licenses. The IRS ruled that the gain from the sales was 
patronage-sourced income to the taxpayer. Ltr. Rul. 200404003, 
Oct. 10, 2003. 
CORPORATIONS 
DISTRIBUTION OF STOCK. The taxpayers owned a 
corporation and several subsidiaries which operated retail 
electronics stores. One of the stores incurred labor troubles and 
the taxpayers decided to distribute the stock in the affiliated 
corporation to the shareholders in order to prevent the labor 
problem from spreading to the other stores. The court held that 
distribution of stock met the business purpose requirement of 
I.R.C. § 355 for nontaxable distributions. The IRS had 
acquiesced in this decision but has now withdrawn that 
acquiescence. Olson v. Comm’r, 49 T.C. 94, acq., 1968-2 C.B. 
2, withdrawn I.R.B. 2004-__. 
DEPRECIATION. The taxpayer’s return did not claim the 
additional first year 30 percent depreciation deduction but the 
taxpayer failed to include a statement to elect out of the 
additional depreciation. The IRS ruled that, under Rev. Proc. 
2003-50, I.R.B. 2003-29, 119, the failure to claim the 30 percent 
additional depreciation deduction on a return where a 
depreciation was claimed was deemed an election out of the 
additional depreciation deduction; thus, no extension of time 
was necessary to file the missing election statement. Ltr. Rul. 
200404032, Oct. 22, 2003. 
DISASTER LOSSES. On January 13, 2004, the President 
determined that certain areas in California were eligible for 
assistance under the Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance 
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5121, as a result of an earthquake that began 
on December 22, 2003. Accordingly, taxpayers who sustained 
losses attributable to the disaster may deduct the losses on their 
2002 federal income tax returns. 
On January 13, 2004, the President determined that certain 
areas in American Samoa were eligible for assistance under the 
Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. § 
5121, as a result of high winds, high surf and heavy rainfall 
that began on January 2, 2004. Accordingly, taxpayers who 
sustained losses attributable to the disaster may deduct the losses 
on their 2003 federal income tax returns. 
HOBBY LOSSES. The taxpayers, husband and wife, 
purchased 666 acres of rural land. The taxpayers raised some 
cattle on the land but did not report any sales of cattle. The 
taxpayers also planted trees on the property and studied the 
marketing and sale of emission reduction credits. The farm 
improvements substantially added to the value of the farm. The 
court held that the taxpayers did not operate the farm with the 
intent to make a profit because (1) the taxpayers did not keep 
sufficient records to analyze the profit making capability of the 
operation; (2) the amount of appreciation in value of the farm 
was not proven; (3) no sales of cattle, trees or emission reduction 
credits were made; (4) the operation had only losses of over 
$1.5 million; (5) the losses offset substantial income from other 
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sources; and (6) the taxpayers had personal pleasure from living 
on the ranch. Garbini v. Comm’r, T.C. Summary Op. 2004­
7. 
HOME OFFICE. The taxpayer had purchased a large 
residence and rented 89 percent of the property to a corporation 
in which the taxpayer was a major shareholder. The court 
determined which areas of the property were allocated to the 
corporation based on the corporation’s and its employees’ use 
of the property. The taxpayer used the remainder of the residence 
for the taxpayer’s personal residence. The court determined the 
fair rental value of the property and allowed the corporation a 
deduction for rent equal to 89 percent of that value. The taxpayer 
was allowed deductions for 89 percent of the insurance, 
mortgage interest, real estate taxes and depreciation of the 
property. Cutts v. Comm’r, T.C. Summary Op. 2004-8. 
LIKE-KIND EXCHANGES. The taxpayer was a farmer 
who owned the ground water irrigation rights to farm land. The 
water rights were limited to 1,100 gallons per minute and 195 
acre-feet per year. There was no duration limit on the rights but 
the state had the power to reduce the pumping rate and annual 
limit. The taxpayer exchanged the water rights for additional 
farm land. The IRS distinguished this situation from that in 
Wiechens v. United States, 228 F. Supp. 2d 1080 (D. Ariz. 2002), 
where the water rights were limited to 50 years and were not 
considered like-kind as to a fee interest in land. Because the 
taxpayer’s water rights were not limited in time and were limited 
only as to annual use, the IRS ruled that the water rights were 
of sufficient like-kind to a fee interest in land to qualify the 
transaction for like-kind exchange treatment under I.R.C. § 
1031. Ltr. Rul. 200404044, Oct. 23, 2003. 
LOTTERY WINNINGS. The taxpayer won the Oregon 
Lottery and was to receive annual payments for 20 years. After 
five years, the taxpayer decided to assign the remaining 
payments to a third party in exchange for a lump sum payment. 
The taxpayer characterized the lump sum as long-term capital 
gain. The trial court acknowledged that the case was without 
precedent and needed a decision by an appellate court, but held 
that, because the original proceeds were classified as ordinary 
income, the lump sum payment was also ordinary income, even 
though received from an assignment of the right to receive the 
annual payments. The appellate court affirmed. Maginnis v. 
United States, 2004-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,149 (9th 
Cir. 2004), aff’g, 2002-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,494 (D. 
Or. 2002). 
MEAL EXPENSES. The taxpayer was employed as a 
merchant seaman and during a tour of duty would incur personal 
expenses for meals ashore during port calls. The taxpayer 
provided proof of the expenses with a written log; however, the 
court discredited the log as prepared for the litigation and not 
prepared contemporaneously with the expenses. The court 
disallowed the meal expenses for lack of substantiation. Jewett 
v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 204-26. 
PARTNERSHIPS 
DIVIDEND DISTRIBUTIONS. The IRS has announced 
that it is appropriate for a partner of an electing large 
partnership (ELP) to take into account separately the partner’s 
distributive share of the partnership’s dividends received that 
are qualified dividend income as defined in I.R.C. § 
1(h)(11)(B). Under I.R.C. § 772(a)(11), partners in an ELP 
may into account separately the partner’s distributive share of 
partnership items only to the extent that the IRS determines 
that the separate treatment of these items is appropriate. Notice 
2004-5, I.R.B. 2004-7. 
PENSION PLANS. The IRS has issued a revenue ruling as 
to whether certain plans meet the requirements of I.R.C. § 
416(g)(4)(H) so that the plans are not considered top-heavy 
under I.R.C. § 416. A nongovernmental profit-sharing plan 
containing a cash or deferred arrangement (“CODA”) 
described in I.R.C. § 401(k) provided for safe harbor matching 
contributions that were intended to satisfy the requirements 
of I.R.C. § 401(k)(12)(B) and otherwise satisfy the 
requirements of I.R.C. § 401(k)(12). The plan also permitted 
the employer to make a nonelective contribution for any plan 
year at the employer’s discretion. The nonelective contribution 
was subject to five-year vesting described in I.R.C. § 
411(a)(2)(A) and was allocated to participants’ accounts in 
the same ratio that each participant’s compensation had to the 
compensation of all participants. The plan was a calendar-year 
plan and covered all employees of the employer (including 
highly compensated employees as defined in I.R.C. § 414(q)) 
who had one year of service and were age 21 or older. Other 
than elective contributions and the matching contributions, no 
other contributions are made to the plan for 2004 and there 
are no forfeitures. In the second situation, the facts were the 
same as in first situation, except the employer made a 
discretionary, nonelective contribution to the plan for 2004. 
In the third situation, the facts are the same as in the first 
situation, except forfeitures occurred in 2004 due to the 
severance from employment of a participant who was not fully 
vested in amounts attributable to discretionary nonelective 
contributions made in a prior year. Pursuant to the terms of 
the plan, forfeitures were allocated to participants’ accounts 
for 2004 in the same manner as nonelective contributions. In 
the fourth situation, the facts are the same as in the first 
situation, except employees were permitted to make elective 
contributions immediately upon commencement of 
employment but were not eligible for matching contributions 
until they completed one year of service with the employer. 
The IRS ruled that the plan in the first situation met the 
requirements of I.R.C. § 416(g)(4)(H) and was therefore not 
subject to the top-heavy rules in I.R.C. § 416 for 2004 because 
no other contributions are made to the plans other than 
contributions described in I.R.C. § 401(k)(12) or I.R.C. § 
401(m)(11). The plans in the second, third and fourth situations 
did not meet the requirements of I.R.C. § 416(g)(4)(H) and 
were, therefore, subject to the top-heavy rules in I.R.C. § 416 
for 2004. Rev. Rul. 2004-13, I.R.B. 2004-7. 
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The IRS has ruled that, if an eligible retirement plan separately 
accounts for amounts attributable to rollover contributions to 
the plan, the distributions of those amounts are subject to the 
restrictions on permissible timing that apply, under the applicable 
requirements of the IRC, to distributions of other amounts from 
the plan. Rev. Rul. 2004-12, I.R.B. 2004-7. 
The IRS has issued a revenue procedure which outlines the 
procedures of the IRS with respect to applications for waivers 
of the minimum funding standard for defined benefit plans under 
either I.R.C. § 412(d) or Section 303 of the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). Rev. Proc. 2004-15, 
I.R.B. 2004-7. 
The taxpayer maintained a qualified defined contribution plan 
that provided that a participant who terminates employment will 
receive payment of a vested account balance under the plan 
commencing at normal retirement age or, if later, at termination 
of employment (subject to I.R.C. § 401(a)(9), in the case of a 5 
percent owner). The plan permuted a participant who terminates 
employment prior to normal retirement age to elect at any time 
after termination of employment to receive an immediate 
distribution of the vested account balance. The plan provided 
that certain administrative expenses, e.g., investment 
management fees, were to be allocated to the individual accounts 
of participants and beneficiaries based upon the ratio of each 
account balance to the total account balances of all participants 
and beneficiaries. The plan further provided that the share of 
these expenses allocable to each participant’s and beneficiary’s 
account will be paid from the plan and charged against the 
account to the extent not paid by the employer. The taxpayer 
paid the portion of these expenses allocable to the accounts of 
current employees, but not those of former employees or their 
beneficiaries. All of the administrative expenses were proper 
plan expenses, within the meaning of ERISA and were 
reasonable with respect to the services to which they relate. The 
IRS ruled that the plan did not fail to satisfy the requirements of 
I.R.C. § 411(a)(11) merely because it charged reasonable plan 
administrative expenses to the accounts of former employees 
and their beneficiaries on a pro rata basis, but did not charge the 
accounts of current employees. The IRS also ruled that the plan 
would not fail to comply with the requirements of I.R.C. § 
411(a)(11) merely because it charged reasonable plan 
administrative expenses to the accounts of former employees 
and their beneficiaries, but not the accounts of current employees, 
on another reasonable basis that complies with the requirements 
of Title I of ERISA. Rev. Rul. 2004-10, I.R.B. 2004-7. 
For plans beginning in February 2004, the weighted average 
is 5.23 percent with the permissible range of 4.70 to 5.49 percent 
(90 to 120 percent permissible range) and 4.70 to 5.75 percent 
(90 to 110 percent permissible range) for purposes of determining 
the full funding limitation under I.R.C. § 412(c)(7). Notice 2004­
14, I.R.B. 2004-__. 
RETURNS. The IRS has published an updated list of time-
sensitive acts involving federal taxes which may be postponed 
while a taxpayer is serving in the U.S. Armed Forces in a combat 
zone. Rev. Proc. 2004-13, I.R.B. 2004-4. 
S CORPORATIONS 
EMPLOYEE. The taxpayer was an S corporation with one 
shareholder who was also the sole officer and director. The 
taxpayer operated a business of veterinary surgical 
consultations for other veterinarians. The business operations 
were performed by the shareholder and the business was 
located at the shareholder’s residence. The corporation did not 
have a separate bank account and the business and personal 
income and expenses were handled through the shareholder’s 
personal bank account. The corporation reported income for 
1997 and 1998, deductions for compensation paid to officers, 
but no deductions for wages or salaries. The shareholder 
reported the shareholder’s share of income from the corporation 
on Schedule K-1 and Schedule E. The corporation did not 
withhold or pay any employment taxes. The court held that 
the shareholder was an employee of the taxpayer and the 
taxpayer was required to withhold, report and pay employment 
taxes. Nu-Lock Design, Inc. v. Comm’r, 2004-1 U.S. Tax 
Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,138 (3d Cir. 2004), aff’g, T.C.  Memo. 2003­
52; Superior Proside, Inc. v. Comm’r, 2004-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 
(CCH) ¶ 50,146 (3d Cir. 2004), aff’g, T.C. Memo. 2003-50. 
STOCK BASIS. The taxpayers formed an S corporation 
which operated a lumber business. The corporation incurred 
debts with log suppliers and trucking firms and the taxpayers 
were required to personally guarantee the corporation’s debts. 
The taxpayers claimed pass-through losses from the 
corporation based on stock basis increased by the amount of 
the loan guarantees. Although the court expressed its 
disagreement with the holding in Selfe v. United States, 778 
F.2d 769 (11th Cir. 1985), it also held that the facts in this case 
were not as strong as in Selfe in that the taxpayers had not 
pledged any assets as collateral for the loans. The court held 
that the taxpayers’ basis in their S corporation stock was not 
increased by the loan guarantees because the taxpayer made 
no economic outlay of money or assets. Luiz v. Comm’r, T.C. 
Memo. 2004-21. 
SALE OF PROPERTY. The taxpayer had purchased 
equipment and goodwill in a gas station which the taxpayer 
operated for several years. The sales agreement allocated 
$5,000 to goodwill. The taxpayer sold the goodwill and 
equipment and claimed gain on the sale based upon an income 
tax basis of the full purchase price plus the cost of 
improvements. The court  held that the taxpayer’s basis was 
limited to the $5,000 paid for goodwill, a nondepreciable asset, 
because (1) the taxpayer failed to prove the existence and costs 
of the improvements and (2) the taxpayer failed to prove that 
the depreciable assets had not been fully depreciated. Secapure 
v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2004-18. 
CITATION UPDATES 
Alfaro v. Comm’r, 349 F.3d 225 (5th Cir. 2003), aff’g, 
T.C. Memo. 2002-309 (interest deduction), see 14 Agric. L. 
Dig. 181 (2003). 
Pauly v. USDA, 348 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 2003) (shared 
appreciation agreements), see 14 Agric. L. Dig. 180 (2003). 
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